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The mounting frequency and intensity of natural hazards, alongside growing interdependencies 
between social-technical and ecological systems, are placing increased pressure on emergency man-
agement. This is particularly true at the strategic level of emergency management, which involves 
planning for and managing non-routine, high-consequence events. Drawing on the literature, 
a survey, and interviews and workshops with Australia’s senior emergency managers, this paper 
presents an analysis of five core challenges that these pressures are creating for strategic-level emer-
gency management. It argues that emphasising ‘emergency management’ as a primary adaptation 
strategy is a retrograde step that ignores the importance of addressing socio-political drivers of vul-
nerabilities. Three key suggestions are presented that could assist the country’s strategic-level 
emergency management in tackling these challenges: (i) reframe emergency management as a 
component of disaster risk reduction rather than them being one and the same; (ii) adopt a network 
governance approach; and (iii) further develop the capacities of strategic-level emergency managers.
Keywords: Australia, climate change adaptation, network governance, strategic-
level emergency management
Introduction
The mounting frequency and intensity of natural hazards, alongside growing inter-
dependencies between social-technical and ecological systems, are establishing an 
increasingly complex set of challenges for emergency management (Murphy and 
Dunn, 2012). At the strategic level of emergency management, which involves plan-
ning for and managing non-routine, high-consequence events, these challenges are 
particularly acute and likely to become more critical in the future. The potential for 
major consequences means that there is significant political interest in this level of 
management, including great concern about the direct and indirect effects on longer-
term economic and societal well-being, and intense community and media scrutiny. 
 The role of strategic emergency management in Australia can best be understood 
in terms of cross-agency coordination between the operational, tactical, and strategic 
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levels of emergency management (Paton and Owen, 2013). The operational level 
represents first responders activated at the onset of an incident. The tactical level 
involves local incident management teams working to support responders in contain-
ing and mitigating events and to share information aimed at helping communities 
make informed decisions. Strategic arrangements take place at the regional, state, 
or national level and serve to guide overall management of the process, including 
addressing whole-of-government and community concerns regarding the broader 
implications of the event and longer-term recovery. Consequently, people working 
at the strategic level assume important leadership roles in understanding, articulat-
ing, planning for, and managing emergencies. Increasingly, these people have to work 
in shifting environmental, socio-political, and technological contexts. 
 Drawing on a literature review, a survey, and both interviews and workshops with 
Australia’s senior emergency managers, this analysis focuses on core challenges fac-
ing strategic emergency management in Australia, and identifying proposals for 
addressing them. While the challenges are necessarily presented sequentially, the most 
central issue facing the sector is their intertwining and interacting nature. Hence, 
actions to address these challenges need to be systemic and systematic. 
 After outlining the research methodology, the paper examines five core challenges 
facing future strategic-level emergency management in Australia. It then presents 
three key suggestions that could assist the country’s strategic-level emergency man-
agement in addressing them: (i) reframe emergency management as a component 
of disaster risk reduction (DRR) (rather than them being treated as one and the same); 
(ii) adopt a network governance approach; and (iii) further develop the capacities of 
strategic-level emergency managers. 
Methodology
The interviews, survey, workshops, and feedback provided participants with multiple 
ways of voicing, discussing, and reflecting on their perceptions of current and future 
challenges facing strategic-level emergency management. They were asked to espe-
cially consider challenges facing the emergency management industry’s critical needs 
over the next 5–10 years. 
 The study participants were all senior leaders with considerable experience in 
emergency service organisations. The median number of years that they had been 
in the sector was 24, and the median number of years within their particular agency 
was 13. An initial round of interviews with 34 strategic-level emergency managers 
identified indicative themes among the core challenges. Two subsequent workshops 
validated those themes, which were synthesised into an industry report (Owen et al., 
2013). This document was circulated to an additional 36 industry leaders via the 
Chief Executive Officer of the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities 
Council who invited them to nominate at least two members of personnel who they 
considered to be well-placed to discuss the topic. Another 19 senior members of the 
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broader emergency management community with experience in strategic-level emer-
gency operations centres were also invited to take part in the survey. From a potential 
pool of 89, 38 responses were received, representing a return rate of 42 per cent. 
According to 91 per cent of survey respondents, the report represented the key chal-
lenges to strategic-level emergency management well or very well. In addition to 
commenting on the report’s findings, participants were asked to provide suggestions 
for possible actions to tackle the identified challenges. The following section outlines 
the challenges pinpointed through this process, including some of the fundamental 
drivers, and possible approaches to remedying them. 
Core challenges
The study identified five core challenges confronting Australia’s strategic-level emer-
gency management:
•	 Increasingly	complex	context	(environmental,	social,	and	technological	change).
•	 Tensions	between	political	drivers	and	operational	realities.
•	 The	role	of	emergency	management	in	community	resilience.
•	 Measures	of	effectiveness.
•	 Information	systems	and	social	media.
 The following subsections describe these five challenges and examine their drivers. 
Three proposals are then set out that could assist the country’s strategic-level emer-
gency management in addressing these challenges.
Increasingly complex context (environmental, social, and technological 
change)
Participants described one of the most substantial challenges they face as the increas-
ing number and complexity of significant emergency events, driven by dynamic 
interactions between environmental, political, social, and technical changes. They 
pointed to mounting evidence of increases in the frequency, duration, and magnitude 
of emergency events in Australia and New Zealand driven by a changing climate 
(Yates and Bergin, 2009; Bureau of Meteorology, Australian Government, 2010; 
Council of Australian Governments, 2011; Murphy and Dunn, 2012). The impor-
tance of climate change pertains in part to its role in producing ‘changes in the 
frequency, intensity, spatial extent, duration, and timing of weather and climate 
extremes, and . . . unprecedented extremes’ (Field et al., 2012, p. 111), as well as in 
boosting the prospects of simultaneous events. One participant (14)1 noted that:
These mega fires that people talk about—huge fires that are infrequent but catastrophic and 
incredibly expensive to deal with . . . We’re going to get more of those with climate change 
and with fewer people to deal with them. So, your firefighting is either going to become more 
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expensive cause you’ll be aerial firefighting or you’re just going to have to be prepared to 
accept much greater damage bills.
 Participants also discussed how changes occurring within economic, environmen-
tal, and social systems are interacting with a changing climate. Climate change was 
considered important because it will compound factors already contributing to social-
ecological vulnerabilities to natural hazards (Bosomworth and Handmer, 2008). 
For instance, only six per cent of the Australian landmass is arable, and land clear-
ing, water extraction, and poor soil conservation are degrading the quality of this 
limited resource (Australian Government, 2014). By exacerbating the impact of soil 
degradation, climate change has the capacity to heighten the vulnerabilities of com-
munities, agriculture, and natural resource management, which depend in part on 
quality soils. 
 Participants also highlighted the increasing urbanisation of both coastal areas and 
hinterlands as augmenting pressures on human and natural systems. For example, 
since the mid-1970s, Australia has witnessed the movement of retirees, ‘alternative 
lifestylers’, and those who are able to conduct their business through the internet 
(often termed ‘tree-changers’ or ‘sea-changers’) from metropolitan cities to non-
metropolitan parts of the country (Murphy 2002; Burnley and Murphy, 2004). 
Participants contended that these ‘tree- and sea-changers’ were accustomed to exten-
sive government and agency support during events in urban areas, and that they 
expect the same level of service delivery in rural areas to which they move. One (15) 
posited that this situation potentially increases the vulnerabilities of such groups to 
hazard events: 
I perceive rural people have got much better resilience. They know that there isn’t an 
ambulance around the corner. They can’t just ring 000 because I’m hot—but we get those 
calls in Melbourne. [Rural people] are prepared to look after themselves and an emergency 
is an emergency when I can’t cope with it anymore. Whereas in Melbourne, it’s quite 
different: an emergency is when I don’t want to cope with it and I call somebody else. So 
I think the community expectations is a problem and it’s leading to a lack of resilience par-
ticularly in the metropolitan areas, and also for people who move from the country to the 
city, at least that is my experience.
 The country’s strategic emergency managers are also concerned that the growing 
interdependence between infrastructural, social, and technical systems is boosting 
vulnerabilities to hazards. Interdependencies between energy, transport, and food 
production systems, for instance, mean that the disaster impacts experienced in one 
community can affect many other communities (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2010). Participants 
were particularly concerned that intensifying significant events increase the chances 
of a breakdown in a ‘weak link’ in interconnected critical infrastructure systems. 
This is because critical infrastructure is important in a modern society reliant on 
the effective functioning of utilities to provide public services, maintain a quality 
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of life, and encourage economic growth. Despite the sometimes fragile nature of 
essential critical infrastructure services during disaster events, industrialised socie-
ties expect that they will be available during extreme events (Boin and McConnell, 
2007; Gheorghe et al., 2007; Marti and Hollman, 2008; Sarriegi et al., 2008; Beccuti 
et al., 2012). 
Tensions between political drivers and operational realities
Another increasingly important challenge for strategic-level emergency management 
is political involvement during significant events. It is well-recognised that, in a time 
of crisis or emergency, political leaders are expected to be informed and demonstrate 
visible leadership (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003; Boin, ‘t Hart, and McConnell, 2009). 
While acknowledging that government ministers have an important role to play 
during operational responses in providing authority and credibility and informing 
strategic decision-making, study participants noted that the relationship between the 
political and operational aspects of emergency management can be challenging. They 
suggested that, particularly during significant events, some political responses are 
ad hoc, inconsistent, and concerned with ‘messages for the media’ or achieving a 
political position. These tensions were seen to be due to a lack of shared understand-
ing and agreed processes. 
 Participants proposed that their cohort should seek to understand the socio-political 
environment in which politicians operate, and underlined a need for secondments to 
ministerial offices as well as leadership development in diplomacy. They advocated 
establishing agreed arrangements, relationships, and understandings well before any 
major event, enabling a coordinated approach to fulfilling political and operational 
needs. One (30) stated that:
Forums and roles need to be exercised to engender familiarity and to build and maintain 
the personal relationships and trust that is required to work effectively at these levels.
 They were also of the collective view that the most effective political leaders sought 
briefings from agency staff and were careful not to raise community expectations 
beyond what emergency services could meet. Expectations and the roles and respon-
sibilities of emergency services and political actors are intertwined with questions about 
how communities and politicians evaluate emergency management performance. This 
issue is expanded below.
The role of emergency management in community resilience
Two dominant phrases in emergency management parlance and policy documents 
represented another core challenge for strategic emergency management: 
•	 shared responsibility; and 
•	 disaster resilience.
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While acknowledging that a broad notion of ‘shared responsibility’ could be impor-
tant (McLennan and Handmer, 2012), senior managers in this study expressed dis-
quiet about what it actually constitutes and whether there is a shared understanding 
of the concept. Their disquiet centred on whether the concept reflects more neo-
liberal ideas of ‘small government’ (and therefore a reduction in community services) 
or of gaps between what can reasonably be expected from populations during extreme 
events and what they are willing or capable of doing. Many participants were con-
cerned that communities often are left to manage residual risks shifted towards indi-
viduals whether or not they have the financial, physical, mental, or social capacity 
to manage them, such as managing natural hazard risks after susceptible lands have 
been approved for development (cf. Handmer, 2003). 
 Participants also suggested that, while ‘disaster resilience’ could serve as an over-
arching concept for integrated and proactive emergency management planning, there 
is a distinct lack of a shared understanding of what constitutes resilience, and, hence, 
what role strategic-level emergency management should and could play in its imple-
mentation. For instance, they noted that attempts to enhance community resilience 
are undermined by mixed and sometimes contradictory messages from different emer-
gency service organisations and governments. One (22) said that: 
We tell people that they’ve got to be self-reliant in the case of flooding but here’s [name of 
emergency service] with a couple of helicopters that are on permanent standby and so of 
course the minute there’s a flood anywhere, they’re filling them up with milk and bread 
and going around doing air drops to houses. So on the one hand you tell people to be 
self-reliant and on the other hand what you’re actually demonstrating is there’s generally 
no need to be self-reliant, we will come and fix things up for you and you also generate the 
capacity for resentment, aggravation and argument if a person happens to be one of the few 
who didn’t have the helicopter arrive and drop the bread.
 The capacity to address and support community resilience is linked to many of the 
other identified challenges, particularly the need to address socio-political drivers of 
vulnerabilities. Yet, the matter of the role (and capacity) of the emergency services 
in directly addressing them largely remains unexplored. 
 Participants were far from settled on the concept of disaster resilience and the 
role of strategic-level emergency management within the broader agenda of DRR. 
On the one hand, one group asserted that, owing to financial cutbacks, the sector 
should focus solely on emergency response. Another framed the role of emergency 
management as being about connecting response and recovery, including commu-
nity engagement activities that support preparedness. A final group argued that, for 
strategic-level emergency management to fulfil its role in DRR, planning needs to 
incorporate a much wider and more integrated and longer-term view, necessitating 
active interaction with the political system. As one (30) participant put it: 
This means a seat at strategic decision-making forums and associated accountability for 
those decisions.
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Measures of effectiveness
Related to the role of emergency management in community resilience is the chal-
lenge of addressing community (and therefore political) expectations or defining and 
measuring emergency management efficacy. Participants consistently described com-
munity expectations as increasingly unrealistic and argued that, as a consequence, 
community disaster resilience had declined. They argued that a central driver of this 
challenge is an expectation that emergency service organisations will provide a con-
sistent level of service despite mounting evidence that presently unsustainable lifestyles 
are making people ever more vulnerable to a changing climate and associated extreme 
events. One (30) noted that:
There is a general expectation among community members that it is the government’s role 
to keep them safe and . . . any strategy to do so should not impinge on individual freedoms. 
Government and emergency management agencies have accepted, and at times actively 
encouraged, this belief to the point that many emergency management agencies perceive their 
primary role is to ‘bring order out of chaos’ under emergency management conditions. This 
leads to a re-enforcement of the response model at the expense of the risk mitigation model 
in agency, community, and political contexts.
 In many jurisdictions, while monitoring and review strategies are being developed, 
there is concern that external sources (such as the media) evaluate the success or 
failure of emergency management in a post-hoc and arbitrary manner, and that this 
‘evaluation’ is primarily dependent on whether or not there was a good outcome 
(Owen et al., 2012). Participants suggested that the ramifications of such capricious 
evaluations combined with potentially unrealistic community expectations include 
increasingly adversarial post-event inquiries. They added that it is dampening the 
interest of existing and potential senior managers in assuming critical decision-
making roles, both because of perceived exposure to litigation and a desire not to be 
portrayed as having ‘let the community down’.
 Part of this challenge relates to establishing agreed outcome measures and dif-
ficulties in setting universal standards that can be applied across all scales of events 
given the subjective nature of performance assessments. In many other safety critical 
industries, sole reliance on outcome measures has been found to be flawed and even 
dangerous for the longer-term viability of the system (Dekker, 2006; Hollnagel, Woods, 
and Levensen, 2006). Equally, the outcome of an emergency might have been posi-
tive, despite unsafe practices and risks taken by all involved (including community 
members), and it was simply down to luck that there was not an adverse outcome 
(Dekker, 2006). Conversely, all the best measures and processes may have been in 
place and performed well, but in spite of harm being minimised, there may still have 
been negative impacts. As a couple of participants (4 and 22) pointed out:
This is a fundamental question. Can they [significant events] be well managed? The 
minute we ask the question . . . then that immediately limits the conceptualisation of the 
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problem. The whole point of going down the resilience path was to rethink this idea not just 
another name change. Is it not about adapt and innovate in the face of very rapid change; 
very different to managing. You don’t manage a Black Saturday.
This is a tricky one and one which is not palatable to the community . . . the Victorian 
fires [of 2009] in my view had a good management outcome. . . . [We] could have been 
looking at 5,000 deaths from that fire.
 Participants were particularly concerned that there needed to be wider and more 
explicit support for risk reduction activities. This was the case even when such efforts 
may seem to inconvenience communities at the time of their implementation, such 
as tolerance of smoke from fuel reduction burning or acceptance of certain land use 
or development constraints or even exclusions.
 Participants suggested that there needed to be a dialogue to address expectations 
regarding management of significant or unbounded events and, given economic and 
social constraints, acceptable levels of risk (Kapucu, 2008). They suggested that internal 
debriefs and reviews should continue to facilitate continuous improvement and learn-
ing, and that a national-level, multi-jurisdictional ‘roundtable’ develop, trial, and review 
fit-for-purpose performance criteria. They also emphasised that development of pro-
cess and outcome measures appropriate to the industry could assist personnel and 
external stakeholders in better recognising challenges and accord personnel with 
some protection during post-hoc, adversarial inquiries. As a couple of participants 
(27 and 24) stated:
[We are not] of a mindset to ensure that the public knows just how difficult a task is under-
taken at times.
These objectives (i.e. purpose for EM) and performance indicators would be based on a clear 
value proposition for the various stakeholders.
 Several participants noted that such dialogue needs to extend beyond an apprecia-
tion of the complexities and limitations of managing responses to significant events 
and include political understanding of and commitment to risk reduction efforts. 
Information systems and social media
Another broad challenge identified by the study’s participants concerned the increas-
ing sophistication and use of information systems and social media, both within the 
sector and communities. A range of data on the use of information systems during 
significant events reinforces the extent of the challenge. In a sophisticated techno-
logical age, the use of information systems during disasters is inevitable and necessary 
owing to the multitude of public and private organisations now involved in strategic-
level emergency management, each with their own specific information require-
ments (Comfort et al., 2004; Turoff et al., 2004a, 2004b; Van de Walle and Turoff, 
2008). Yet, financial constraints and a lack of uniformity in standardising disaster 
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management information systems often limits the ability to visualise and disseminate 
information (Baber et al., 2007; Militello et al., 2007; Ley et al., 2012). Compounding 
information system incompatibility are privacy and security constraints that complicate 
the sharing of information between organisations at a strategic level. The literature 
indicates a need to explore legislative change in addressing some of these challenges 
(Kruchten et al., 2008; Reddick, 2011; Vogt, Hertweck, and Hales, 2011). 
 Concern about, and interest in, the role of social media during significant emer-
gency events was also expressed. While participants highlighted several ways in which 
social media could potentially support information dissemination, its effective contri-
bution to emergency management was contested. Participants asserted that, although 
information is increasing in diversity and accessibility, its variable quality needs to be 
taken into account. In the words of three (14, 9, and 38) participants:
This is a major challenge for the fire and emergency management sector. This phenomenon 
cannot be stopped, nor can it be totally controlled. The major risk is around the reliability 
of information. Any individual can post information that may or may not be true, which 
others may then use to make life-changing decisions. However it also provides an opportu-
nity. People will tend to place greater trust in ‘official’ sources, provided those sources are 
readily available and current. This places an obligation on fire and emergency organisations 
to embrace these emerging technologies and resource them accordingly.
Cost of personnel being assigned to address social media trivia and hype instead of gathering 
and quality assuring our own intelligence.
Get over it. Lose the fear of something which is not dominated by the hierarchy, appreciate 
its weaknesses and flaws, play to the space and earn a reputation as a trusted source.
 Participants emphasised that addressing this challenge necessitates the creation of 
wider connections and alliances with a new range of organisations and social media 
users to examine harnessing and harvesting social media from a variety of perspec-
tives. They also noted that a first step would be to develop relationships with existing 
social media providers and experts, rather than attempt to build expertise in-house or 
to ‘reinvent the wheel’. Finally, some said that there is a need to apply tools that can 
filter ‘crowd-sourced’ information to inform intelligence-gathering teams within emer-
gency management, including mapping images uploaded on to social media websites 
to gain ‘real-time’ intelligence. To make best use of such technologies, the sector could 
start with a review of existing industry practices on the use of social media. 
Addressing the challenges
(Re)frame emergency management as a component of DRR
Study participants contended that, to address these challenges, there is a need to 
explicitly frame the role of strategic emergency management within a broader DRR 
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context. As outlined earlier, strategic emergency management guides the overall han-
dling of major events, including tackling of whole-of-government and community 
worries about consequences and longer-term recovery. DRR has a much wider 
agenda as it is concerned with addressing socio-political drivers of vulnerability to 
hazards (Pelling, 2003; Field et al., 2012). Participants highlighted that the efficacy 
of strategic-level emergency management is very much influenced by this broader 
DRR agenda. Moreover, the majority of Australia’s strategic-level emergency man-
agers fear that the industry’s existing challenges will become increasingly difficult 
to resolve without greater efforts to address socio-political drivers of vulnerabilities. 
In short, there was concern that emergency management was equated with DRR, 
rather than being considered one component of that broader agenda. As one (4) par-
ticipant put it:
We’re expected to arrive on the day of the disaster and somehow hold back the waters, stop 
the catastrophic mega fire and we can’t do it. And then we get blamed because the town 
planning or the building infrastructure laws were not enforced and people build on the flood 
zone and the local council caved in to the developer and all of that. . . . This [need for 
change] will fall into place once the core problem is reconceptualised. It’s meaningless until 
then. There is some very good stuff out there once [the need] to change has been accepted.
 Recognising the challenges exacerbated by the increasing occurrence of ‘non-
routine and unbounded events’ (Handmer and Dovers, 2007) and a changing socio-
political/environmental landscape, most participants flagged the need to review and 
clarify the role of emergency service organisations. Such a perspective reflects the 
idea of reflexive learning in reframing policy problems (Schon and Rein, 1994; 
Bosomworth, 2015) to explore and understand better their multidimensional nature. 
One suggestion from this study is to facilitate a dialogue on the public value of emer-
gency management, including a realistic portrayal of capacity and community expec-
tations, as it operates within a broader setting. 
 These senior managers attached greatest weight to situating their work within 
community-based DRR efforts. Hence, there is a need to reposition clearly emer-
gency management on the broader agenda of DRR as it relates to community resil-
ience. Theoretically, DRR concentrates on the underlying drivers of vulnerability 
to hazards, with an overall focus on capacity-building and development (Wisner et 
al., 2004), as well as on reducing or avoiding pre-existing socio-political factors that 
turn an emergency event into a disaster. 
 Viewing Australia’s strategic-level emergency management as a contributor to 
DRR that is greatly influenced by the efficacy of that broader agenda could provide 
a conceptual and practical framework via which it might better achieve its goals. 
Perhaps more importantly, explicitly contextualising emergency management within 
a broader societal agenda of DRR and its relationship with resilience and sustain-
ability could help the sector to manage some of the identified challenges. Australia’s 
National Strategy for Disaster Resilience (Council of Australian Governments, 2011) may 
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offer some political imprimatur for such an approach. However, efforts under its 
auspices will need to be accompanied by an emphasis on tackling the underlying socio-
political drivers of vulnerability, which could do more to reduce the impacts of haz-
ards, as opposed to turning increasingly to emergency management for the solution.
Leadership capacity-building
Demands associated with incident complexity, managing increasing expectations, and 
recognising certain limited capacities of the sector present new challenges for leader-
ship and strategic planning, including a need to change the cultural institutions of 
the emergency services. First, there is a requirement for knowledge and skills among 
personnel in strategic-level emergency management teams, as well as for political 
representatives to be fully engaged in and have an understanding of the entirety of 
emergency management. Political decision-makers must be engaged before a crisis 
so that operational objectives and possibilities are well-understood in the ‘heat of the 
moment’. In addition, strategic-level emergency managers need to become more 
directly involved in policy matters, particularly those connected to DRR, and not 
see themselves as somehow ‘separate’ from public policy processes. 
 A holistic view of the challenges identified here also points to a need to support the 
development of new skills among strategic-level emergency managers and members 
of their teams, especially in sharing, refuting, and calibrating distributed situational 
information to build ‘collective meaning structures’ (Kruke and Olsen, 2012). It also 
indicates a need to forge skills that enable recognition of when the quality of decision-
making or performance may be in decline, so that individuals and teams can col-
lectively avoid or recover from such situations. Similarly, study participants raised 
concerns about maintaining a workforce capability in an all-hazards environment, 
given that increasing incident complexity means significant events may involve a set 
of problems not previously experienced. A focus is needed on developing skills in 
‘managing the unknown’, rather than in technical prowess. 
 These concerns reflect many arguments found in the literature. Murphy and Dunn 
(2012, p. 7), for instance, argue that, while training for routine accidents is effective 
at all levels of emergency management, this is not the case for novel or unbounded 
disasters. A lack of training and support for such events places undue stress on people 
who, on the whole, care deeply about the outcomes. A capability to provide what 
Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson (2005) term ‘meta-leadership’ is also an identified 
need across agencies. A number of participants observed that increased cross-agency 
training is required to facilitate sound working relationships and the necessary capa-
bilities for all-hazard environments. 
 All of the challenges discussed in this study yield new objectives for leadership 
and capability development in the emergency services industry, including legislative 
support and technological innovation. Yet, the study found variability in current 
leadership development, with only some jurisdictions having created relevant pro-
grammes. Participants said that a shift towards further leadership development might 
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be facilitated by national-level strategic leadership and training. In addition, they stated 
that learning across the industry could be supported through a ‘safe spaces’ approach 
(Arao and Clemens, 2013) to critical reflection and review. 
 Brooks and Owen (2012) suggest two key strategies to help address these chal-
lenges. The first is to effectively link formal training pathways with assessment, exer-
cise, and role performance, including the three stages of non-technical skills training: 
awareness-raising; practice; and continual reinforcement. The second is to review, 
assess, and possibly develop new ‘rules-of-thumb’ or ‘quick strategies’ for coordi-
nation at the strategic level of emergency management to aid handling of complex, 
dynamic, and uncertain environments. For instance, there is a need to train at what 
Renaud (2010) calls ‘the edge of chaos’, in order to be more effective when coordi-
nating responses to unbounded events. This type of training, where the emphasis 
is on innovation, collaboration, and experimentation, could create an opportunity to 
move from a ‘command-and-control’ type of culture to one characterised by col-
laboration and influence.
Adopt a network governance approach
Participants were concerned that part of what undermines the ability of strategic-
level emergency management to address these increasing complexities is a currently 
disconnected and fragmented policy landscape. For example, emergency service organi-
sations frequently find themselves at the end of a decision-making chain dealing with 
the consequences of a rising number of hazards. It has become ever more common 
in parts of Australia to trade off the risks posed by natural hazards, such as locating 
developments in flood- or fire-prone areas, against an increased emergency manage-
ment capacity (Handmer et al., 2012). In addition, each state has different jurisdictional 
and governance arrangements in place, challenging attempts to integrate emergency 
service arrangements (Eburn and Dovers, 2012). 
 Difficulties also stem from tensions between administrative areas of responsibility 
within governments, frequently resulting in silo mentalities within organisations and 
sometimes horizontal rivalries vis-à-vis responsibilities and resources (Howes et al., 
2015). Alongside other organisational and institutional changes, such as local govern-
ments downsizing their core business, and outsourcing and relying on contractors 
for plant and operations, administrative tensions have implications for the tackling of 
complex emergency management issues. 
 To address this fragmented policy context, strategic-level emergency management 
needs to adopt a network governance approach, as advocated by Howes et al. (2015). 
Network governance—a necessity in contemporary disasters (Scholtens, 2008)—relies 
not only on the involvement of traditional organisations, such as ambulance, fire, and 
police services, but also on critical infrastructure, communities, and non-governmental 
organisations. Howes et al. (2015) stress that a network governance approach could 
help to address the additional challenge of maintaining currency of knowledge while 
operating in a context increasingly characterised by economic and financial constraints. 
For instance, ongoing workforce restructuring within the emergency services presents 
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real tests to future scanning and strategic planning, and tends to focus attention on 
matters on the immediate horizon.
 However, as Howes et al. (2015) highlight, there are deeply structural and cul-
tural barriers to a network (collaborative) governance approach that also hinder the 
capacity for new learning. Emergency services are traditionally hierarchical in nature 
with clear command-and-control arrangements. Yet in striving to collaborate with 
non-emergency stakeholders, there is a need to emphasise relationships and alli-
ances: horizontal coordination mechanisms among peers rather than vertical control 
mechanisms among commanders and subordinates (Fulk and DeSanctis, 1999; Ostrom, 
2010; Bharosa, Janssen, and Tan, 2011). Participants contended, therefore, that, if 
strategic-level emergency management is to adopt a network governance approach, 
the sector must first overcome these cultural barriers within the industry to encour-
age better alliances and relationships with a wider group of stakeholders. 
 These senior managers pointed out that the traditional reactive ‘command-and-
control’ culture, reinforced by the need to manage and coordinate in a dynamic and 
sometimes chaotic and dangerous emergency environment, needs to be addressed 
across the entire sector. Dominant and collectively-held beliefs of emergency services 
often establish a basis for a stereotypical social identity (Lyng, 1990; Lois, 2001; 
Owen, 2013), such as that they should be able to manage any emergency, no matter 
the context. While much research suggests that the deeply ingrained bureaucratic 
cultures of the emergency services also can compel an allegiance to their own agency 
and foster a culture of rivalry (Marcus, Dorn, and Henderson, 2006; Waugh and Streib, 
2006; Marincioni, 2007), such social identities and rivalries are not unique to the 
emergency services (Edmondson, 2005; Kimmel, 2008). 
 These ‘ideological echo chambers’ (Zuckerman, 2008) and cultural barriers can 
present barriers to reflection and learning from errors. This problem is exacerbated 
by the fact that the sector often is trapped in a perpetual cycle of response, internal 
review, prepare, and respond again (Owen, 2012). Equally, study participants noted 
that, while there is a need to change certain definitions of identity of many actors 
involved in emergency management response, there is also a need to change the 
expectations of community groups, the media, and political leaders (abandoning the 
perception that the services should be able to manage any emergency, no matter 
what the context).
 The main implication of these institutional barriers for strategic-level emergency 
management is that, without a networked governance approach, the sector’s capacity 
for high-level reflection and learning may be constrained. Networked governance 
could help strategic-level emergency management overcome a tendency to react 
within narrow frames of problem-solving, and to challenge the traditional occupa-
tional identity of reactive ‘command and control’. People need to be able to think 
ahead, function in an inclusive manner, and draw on networks in collaborative ways, 
while at the same time engaging in timely decision-making. This takes the argument 
back to the need for a reframing of the role of emergency management within DRR 
and for strategic-level managers to demonstrate leadership in this regard.
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Conclusion
To address the challenges facing future strategic-level emergency management in 
Australia holistically, there is a need to: (i) reframe emergency management as a com-
ponent of DRR rather than emergency management and DRR being one and the 
same; (ii) adopt a network governance approach; and (iii) further develop the capacities 
of strategic-level emergency managers.
 It is vital to consider the long term and to contextualise emergency management 
within the broader goals of DRR and sustainable development. This demands a 
framing of the complex policy problem of emergency management as an important 
component of the broader agenda of DRR. Initiating such a shift could involve 
discussions with the country’s different jurisdictions to develop a nationally-agreed 
position on the role of emergency service organisations in DRR. This may encom-
pass, for instance, redressing the balance of expertise among staff, the integration of 
personnel from different sectors into various planning, preparedness, and response 
activities (and vice versa), and defining the mandate of emergency service organisa-
tions so it is of manageable scope.
 More clearly framing emergency management as a component of DRR would also 
assist in the sector’s adoption of a network governance approach. The way in which 
a sector is framed is partly a reflection of its ‘culture’. Participants argued that a cul-
ture of ‘command and control’ within the emergency service industry risks alienat-
ing the necessary wider group of stakeholders. Addressing that culture could facilitate 
the ability of strategic-level emergency management to more effectively cooperate 
with other groups that collaborate with communities on issues beyond emergency 
management, such as conservation and sporting entities, local government, and health-
care service providers. 
 More clearly defining the scope of emergency management would enable clearer 
definition of the skills and knowledge required by strategic-level emergency man-
agers, including managing political information needs. Collective training and 
information sessions, such as involving politicians and practitioners in planning and 
scenario exercises, would not only enable all participants to enhance their familiar-
ity with processes, but, again, would help to delimit mandates and expectations.
 In light of all of the above, current political shifts towards a reliance on ‘emer-
gency management’ as a climate change adaptation strategy could represent a retro-
grade step that ignores hazard and adaptation research and practice showing that 
dealing with underlying drivers of vulnerabilities is equally, if not more, important 
than just emergency management. Sole reliance on the emergency management sector 
for adaptation not only creates greater pressures on that sector (and unrealistic expec-
tations), it has great potential to make us more vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change, not less. Reframing the complex policy problem of emergency management 
as a key component of DRR, rather than the central component, might at least 
initiate broader institutional shifts towards network governance and, consequently, 
a reduction in the challenges facing strategic-level emergency management. However, 
the sector’s capacity for a paradigm shift remains untested.
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